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The	electoral	victory	of	Imran	Khan:	diffusing	the
dynasties	of	control	in	Pakistan?
The	outward	perception	that	the	newly	elected	Imran	Khan	is	a	military	puppet	is	overly	simplistic,
failing	to	acknowledge	the	public’s	backlash	against	the	Bhutto	and	Sharif	dynasties,	writes	Saloni
Kapur.			
Imran	Khan’s	victory	in	the	general	elections	held	in	Pakistan	in	July	2018	was	met	with	cynicism	in
Western	journalistic	and	policy	circles.	The	New	York	Times	reported	that	Khan’s	“campaign	was	said
to	have	been	backed	by	the	military,”	and	that	military	officials	had	targeted	Khan’s	political	rivals	so	that	his	Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf	(PTI)	party	“could	cruise	to	victory.”	Colin	Cookman	of	the	US	Institute	of	Peace	wrote	on	the	War	on
the	Rocks	website	that	the	PTI	had	“achieved	its	victory	in	part	due	to	the	interventions	of	the	Pakistani	military	and
judiciary	in	the	months	prior	to	the	polls,	which	tilted	the	playing	field	in	favor	of	Khan’s	party.”	An	opinion	piece
published	in	the	Guardian	remarked	that	there	was	“significant	evidence	of	political	manipulation	by	the	military
establishment	during	the	run-up	to	the	election.”	What	these	portrayals	of	Khan	as	a	military	stooge	neglect	is	his
charisma	and	popular	support,	as	well	as	the	context	within	which	his	party	has	won	the	election.
As	I	argue	in	my	forthcoming	book,	Pakistan	after	Trump:	International	Society’s	Role	in	Counterterrorism
Cooperation,	Khan’s	emergence	as	a	significant	political	force	is	an	indicator	of	a	shift	within	Pakistani	society	away
from	dynastic	politics,	and	of	a	diffusion	of	social	control	that	has	been	under	way	in	the	country	since	2007.	Indeed,
as	Maya	Tudor	of	the	Oxford	University	contends,	the	rise	of	the	PTI,	which	has	appealed	to	young,	urban,	educated
voters,	signifies	the	health	of	Pakistani	democracy.	Khan	has	attacked	the	corruption	and	elitism	of	the	political	class,
as	well	as	criticising	US	policy	towards	Pakistan.	As	such,	his	party’s	victory	is	in	line	with	a	trend	of	anti-dynastic	and
anti-corruption	sentiment	in	contemporary	South	Asia,	which	also	characterised	Indian	prime	minister	Narendra
Modi’s	electoral	triumph	in	2014.
In	the	aftermath	of	the	11	September	2001	terrorist	attacks	in	the	United	States,	there	has	been	considerable
disenchantment	within	Pakistan	over	the	government’s	participation	on	the	US-led	“global	war	on	terror.”	Former
president	Pervez	Musharraf	faced	a	backlash	from	Islamist	militant	organisations	after	his	government’s	raid	on	the
Lal	Masjid,	or	Red	Mosque,	in	Islamabad	in	2007.	Unnerved	by	the	army’s	counterterrorism	operations	as	part	of	the
“war	on	terror,”	terrorist	groups	started	to	increasingly	turn	their	ire	towards	the	Pakistani	government	and	security
installations.	Alongside	this	shift,	lawyers	and	civil	society	activists	launched	an	agitation	over	Musharraf’s
suspension	of	chief	justice	Iftikhar	Muhammad	Chaudhry.	As	social	actors	such	as	civil	society	movements,	lawyers’
associations,	Islamist	political	parties,	secular	opposition	parties	and	Islamist	militant	outfits	began	to	assert
themselves	in	national	politics,	Musharraf’s	regime	collapsed	under	the	weight	of	this	combined	assault.
PTI	supporters	sit	on	top	of	a	bus	to	get	a	better	view	of	Imran	Khan	in	Karachi.	Photo	credit:	Wasif	Malik,	Flickr,	CC
BY	2.0.
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Khan’s	victory	in	the	2018	polls	is	a	continuation	of	this	shift	away	from	a	centralised	power	structure	in	favour	of
diffused	social	control	that	commenced	in	2007-08	with	Musharraf’s	downfall.	He	is	neither	a	Bhutto	nor	a	Sharif,	and
this	is	significant	for	a	country	where	civilian	political	power	has	alternated	between	these	two	clans	throughout	the
1990s	and	well	into	the	twenty-first	century.	His	consistent	rhetorical	challenges	to	corruption	and	dynasticism
threaten	the	entrenchment	of	social	control	within	the	hands	of	a	military	and	political	elite	class	that	has
characterised	Pakistan’s	politics	since	the	country’s	birth.	Commentators	have	treated	this	rhetoric	with	realist
cynicism,	but	the	rise	of	these	ideals	to	prominence	in	Pakistani	politics	marks	the	culmination	of	an	important
transformation	that	has	been	taking	place	domestically.
The	question	of	the	military’s	alleged	support	for	the	PTI	is	pertinent,	given	that	Pakistan	has	been	ruled	directly	by
the	military	for	a	significant	proportion	of	its	history.	It	is	highly	plausible	that	the	generals	hope	to	exert	greater
influence	over	the	country’s	politics	through	a	pliant	government.	However,	what	is	significant	here	is	not	that	the
army	is	trying	to	pull	the	strings,	but	the	fact	that	it	has	not	attempted	an	outright	coup.	Given	the	country’s	history,	it
is	unsurprising	that	the	military	should	seek	to	exert	control	over	the	administration.	What	is	remarkable	is	that	it	has
had	to	rely	on	an	unpredictable,	popular	leader	such	as	Khan—by	no	means	the	pliant,	meek	“puppet”	being
portrayed	in	the	Indian	and	Western	media—to	do	so.	As	Shairee	Malhotra	puts	it,	Khan’s	“independent	and
temperamental	nature	might	alarm	the	establishment.”	Similarly,	Husain	Haqqani	argues	that	Khan	“is	not	the	kind	of
man	the	establishment	would	like	to	be	in	charge.	He	is	mercurial	and	unpredictable.”
Despite	Khan’s	unlikely	credentials	as	a	military	stooge,	PTI	has	won	the	election.	This	suggests	that,	as	Christine
Fair	predicted	in	2014,	democracy	is	for	now,	here	to	stay.	As	a	corollary	to	this,	Khan’s	victory	is	a	democratising
event	that	indicates	that	power	can	no	longer	be	the	closely	guarded	prerogative	of	a	tiny	military-political	elite,	but
that	new	actors	are	finding	their	voice,	and	social	control	is	being	dispersed.
In	conclusion,	the	perception	that	Khan	is	a	military	stooge	is	simplistic	and	overlooks	the	wider	shifts	taking	place	in
Pakistan’s	domestic	power	structure.	Like	Modi’s	rise,	which	came	in	the	wake	of	several	corruption	scandals
implicating	India’s	Congress	party,	Khan’s	ascent	comes	on	the	heels	of	former	prime	minister	Nawaz	Sharif’s
conviction	on	corruption	charges	after	the	Panama	Papers	leak.	Seen	in	this	light,	Khan’s	victory	could	be	interpreted
as	a	victory	for	the	ideals	of	accountability	and	democracy,	and	a	potential	sign	of	Pakistan’s	transition	from	a
centralised	to	a	diffused	power	structure.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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